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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4539 
___________ 
 
CARL T. STEWART, JR., 
a/k/a CARL BURTON,  
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DAVID A. VARANO; DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT RONDA M. ELLETT; 
ROBERT MCMILLAN; UM THOMAS MCQINLEY; C/O  EYSTER;  
CAPTAIN JEFFREY MADDEN; G. MILLER; LT. W. P. MILLER;  
JOHN OR JANE DOE (SIGNING OF REQUEST SLIP DATED 1-9-10); 
MS.  MCCARTNEY, Health Care Coordinator; L.S. KERNS-BARR;  
LINDA CHISMAR, CCPM; MICHAEL CORBACIO, CAM II; 
CHARLES CUSTER, UM; ROBERT B. MACINTYRE,  
Chief Hearing Examiner; DORINA VARNER,  
Chief Grievance Officer; SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-01701) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 26, 2015 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  February 9, 2015) 
___________ 
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OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se litigant Carl Stewart appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint 
alleging constitutional violations at the State Correctional Institution at Coal Township 
(SCI-Coal Township) in Pennsylvania.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm 
the District Court’s judgment. 
 On January 1, 2010, Stewart was incarcerated at SCI-Coal Township.  He woke up 
around 2:00 a.m. and headed toward the bathroom to urinate.  Corrections Officer Eyster 
stopped him, saying that he would have to wait until after the 2:00 inmate count was 
completed to use the bathroom.  Stewart informed Eyster that he took a medication that 
caused him to urinate frequently, and that he needed to urinate immediately.  Eyster 
repeated that he would have to wait until after the count and ordered him to return to his 
bunk.  Stewart complied but threatened to file a grievance against Eyster.  The count 
lasted 15 to 20 minutes, during which time Stewart urinated on himself and in a “squeeze 
cheese bottle.”  Afterward, Eyster issued Stewart a misconduct for refusing to obey an 
order and for presence in an unauthorized area.1  The hearing examiner upheld these 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1  A disciplinary hearing report submitted by Stewart as an exhibit to his complaint 
clarifies the origins of these charges.  Eyster said that he ordered Stewart to return to his 
bunk several times before he complied, which was the source of the refusal-to-obey 
charge.  Similarly, Eyster explained that once Stewart was ordered to return to his bunk 
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charges, and Stewart was sentenced to 30 days of cell restriction.  The misconduct also 
disqualified him from a pre-release program in which he had been slated to participate.  
Stewart’s administrative appeals were denied.  
 Stewart filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 30, 2010, 
alleging violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  He named 
Eyster and numerous other prison employees as defendants.  The Defendants moved 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint, and the 
Magistrate Judge recommended granting that motion.  The District Court agreed and 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  Stewart filed a timely notice of appeal.2  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard of review.  See 
Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 First, Stewart argued that the disciplinary proceedings surrounding the misconduct 
violated his due process rights.  The District Court reasoned that this argument was 
barred by the Heck doctrine, which prohibits a prisoner from using a civil suit to attack 
the validity or length of his confinement without first demonstrating that his conviction or 
sentence has been otherwise invalidated.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); 
see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997).  As Stewart rightly contended in his 
                                                                                                                                                  
and refused to do so, he was in an unauthorized area.                     
 
2  Stewart’s notice of appeal was timely pursuant to the District Court’s award of Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) relief. 
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brief before this Court, the Heck doctrine is inapplicable because Stewart did not question 
the validity or length of his confinement in this complaint.  Nonetheless, his due process 
argument fails because it does not implicate a liberty interest; thirty days of cell 
restriction and disqualification from a pre-release program do not represent the “atypical 
and significant hardship on [an] inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” 
that is necessary to state a due process claim in this context.  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 
472, 484 (1995); see also Asquith v. Dep’t of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 412 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(removal from community release program did not implicate a protected liberty interest 
under Sandin). 
 Next, Stewart claimed that Eyster’s refusal to grant him access to the bathroom 
during count time represented an unconstitutional deprivation of life’s basic necessities, 
thereby violating the Eighth Amendment.  To successfully state such a claim, a plaintiff 
must allege that the prison condition in question — here, a brief lack of toilet access — 
was sufficiently serious.  See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359-60 (3d Cir. 1992).  
Stewart’s complaint does not meet this standard, and his reliance on our decision in 
Young only serves to highlight the inadequacy.  In Young, the plaintiff was housed in a 
cell without a toilet for four days; allowed to leave his cell only once to urinate or 
defecate; not provided with toilet paper or permitted to wash his hands before eating, 
despite suffering bouts of diarrhea; not provided water to drink but instead told to drink 
his own urine; and threatened to be chained to a steel slab if he complained.  These 
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allegations, we held, were objectively serious enough to rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation.  See id. at 365.  The fact that Stewart had to wait 15 minutes to 
access a toilet does not.  See Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(momentary deprivation of right to use the bathroom did not offend the Constitution); see 
also Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1013 (6th Cir. 1992) (housing inmates in cells 
without toilets did not violate Eighth Amendment).3   
 To the extent Stewart argued that Appellees violated the Eighth Amendment by 
demonstrating deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, this too fails.  The 
temporary, everyday need to urinate does not constitute a “serious medical need” in this 
context.  Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 
1987) (a serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring 
treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity 
for a doctor’s attention”).  Moreover, Stewart has not sufficiently stated the subjective 
component of an Eighth Amendment claim:  that the prison official acted with deliberate 
indifference to the wanton infliction of pain.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 
                                              
3  The relevant cases that Stewart cited to argue the contrary are inapposite, because, 
among other critical differences, they involved deprivations of toilet access over much 
longer periods of time.  See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734-746 (2002) (inmate 
who was handcuffed to hitching post and made to stand shirtless in the sun for seven 
hours while deprived of any water or a toilet, could demonstrate Eighth Amendment 
violation); Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352-54 (5th Cir. 1999) (inmate required to 
“sleep-out” for seventeen hours with forty-eight other inmates, and forced to openly 
urinate and defecate in an area measuring twenty feet by thirty feet, stated Eighth 
Amendment claim).   
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(1994); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).  There is no indication here that 
requiring Stewart to wait 15 minutes to use a bathroom, in accordance with the facility’s 
standard procedures for inmate counts, demonstrated deliberate indifference on the part 
of either Appellee to an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or the like.  See id. 
 Stewart’s argument that this incident violated the Equal Protection Clause is 
similarly meritless, because, among other deficiencies, his complaint did not describe in 
any detail other inmates who were permitted to use the bathroom during the count while 
he was not.4  See Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 424 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“Where there is no discrimination, there is no equal protection violation.”).  
Similarly, he has not alleged any intentionally different treatment that was so 
exceptionally arbitrary that it could state a “class of one” equal protection claim.  See 
Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 Lastly, Stewart argued that Eyster issued the misconduct in retaliation for 
Stewart’s threat to file a grievance against him, thereby violating the First Amendment.  
                                                                                                                                                  
 
4  Indeed, the exhibits attached to the complaint indicate that as a matter of policy, 
bathrooms are routinely cleared before counts are conducted.  Presumably that is why 
Stewart was not permitted to use the bathroom at the time in question.  In his complaint, 
Stewart makes clear that he saw inmates exiting the bathroom when he tried to enter it, 
and that they did so in the company of (and likely at the behest of) a Corrections Officer.  
“[A]s I was arriving [at the bathroom,] Defendant C/O Eyster asked where I was going[.]  
I stated I have to use the bathroom real bad[,] I take a water pill for my blood pressure 
medication[,] it’ll be real quick.  He stated I will have to wait until after count. [T]hat’s 
when about 5 or 6 inmates came out of the bathroom along with C/O Crispell.”  
[Emphasis added.] 
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To state a claim for retaliation, Stewart must allege facts sufficient to prove (1) that he 
was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) that he suffered an adverse action 
at the hands of prison officials, sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) that his protected activity was a motivating 
factor in the adverse action taken against him.  See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 
(3d Cir. 2003).  Filing a grievance can be constitutionally protected conduct.  See id.  The 
District Court concluded that Stewart had not engaged in such conduct here, because he 
had not actually filed a grievance when Eyster issued the misconduct; he had merely 
threatened to do so.  But that is in fact Stewart’s allegation — that he was retaliated 
against for speaking, which did take place at the relevant moment.  In any event, we 
conclude that under the circumstances presented here — where the complaint itself 
indicated that the misconduct finding alleged to be retaliatory rested on a sufficient 
evidentiary basis (see supra n.1) — Stewart’s allegation did not state a viable claim under 
Rule 12(b)(6).  See Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding 
that a misconduct based on “some evidence” of violation essentially “checkmated” 
litigant’s retaliation claim); see also Farver v. Schwartz, 255 F.3d 473, 474 (8th Cir. 
2001) (claim of retaliation based on issuance of misconduct was properly dismissed 
under Rule 12(b)(6) because the misconduct was supported by some evidence of 
violation). 
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 We are satisfied that leave to amend this complaint would have been futile.  See 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
